fix: pin 6 unpinned action(s)#7343
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Automated security fixes applied by Runner Guard (https://github.com/Vigilant-LLC/runner-guard). Changes: .github/workflows/build.yml | 4 ++-- .github/workflows/clang-format-lint.yml | 2 +- .github/workflows/infer.yml | 2 +- .github/workflows/update-directorymd.yml | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. Additional details and impacted files@@ Coverage Diff @@
## master #7343 +/- ##
=========================================
Coverage 79.46% 79.46%
- Complexity 7083 7084 +1
=========================================
Files 790 790
Lines 23164 23164
Branches 4556 4556
=========================================
Hits 18407 18407
- Misses 4021 4022 +1
+ Partials 736 735 -1 ☔ View full report in Codecov by Sentry. 🚀 New features to boost your workflow:
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Pull request overview
This PR hardens the repository’s GitHub Actions workflows by pinning previously unpinned third-party actions to immutable commit SHAs to reduce supply-chain risk.
Changes:
- Pin
codecov/codecov-actionusages in the build workflow to a commit SHA (keeping the originalv5tag as a comment). - Pin
DoozyX/clang-format-lint-actionto a commit SHA (keeping the originalv0.20tag as a comment). - Pin
ocaml/setup-ocaml,DenizAltunkapan/directory-tree-generator, andpeter-evans/create-pull-requestto commit SHAs (keeping their original version tags as comments).
Reviewed changes
Copilot reviewed 4 out of 4 changed files in this pull request and generated no comments.
| File | Description |
|---|---|
| .github/workflows/build.yml | Pins Codecov action references to a commit SHA for workflow supply-chain hardening. |
| .github/workflows/clang-format-lint.yml | Pins the clang-format-lint third-party action to a commit SHA. |
| .github/workflows/infer.yml | Pins the OCaml setup third-party action to a commit SHA. |
| .github/workflows/update-directorymd.yml | Pins directory generation and PR creation third-party actions to commit SHAs. |
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Security: Harden GitHub Actions workflows
Hey, we found some CI/CD security issues in this repo's workflows using Runner Guard, our open-source CI/CD security scanner at Vigilant. These are the same vulnerability classes being actively exploited right now in the tj-actions, Trivy, LiteLLM supply chain attack chain. We scanned the top 50K repos on GitHub and over 20,000 have this same problem. We're trying to get fixes out to as many maintainers as possible before more repos get hit.
This PR fixes what we could automatically, and flags anything else that needs a manual look. There's a real person behind this PR, we're actively checking back on comments so if you have any questions just drop them here and we'll respond.
Fixes applied (in this PR)
.github/workflows/build.yml.github/workflows/clang-format-lint.yml.github/workflows/infer.yml.github/workflows/update-directorymd.ymlAdvisory: additional findings (manual review recommended)
No additional findings beyond the fixes applied above.
Why this matters
GitHub Actions workflows that use untrusted input in
run:blocks, exposesecrets inline, or use unpinned third-party actions are vulnerable to
code injection, credential theft, and supply chain attacks. These are the same
vulnerability classes exploited in the tj-actions/changed-files incident
and subsequent supply chain attacks, which compromised CI secrets across
thousands of repositories.
How to verify
Review the diff — each change is mechanical and preserves workflow behavior:
(original version tag preserved as comment)
Run
brew install Vigilant-LLC/tap/runner-guard && runner-guard scan .or install from therepo to verify.
Found by Runner Guard | Built by Vigilant Cyber Security | Learn more
If this PR is not welcome, just close it -- we won't send another.